Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets

By David de Meza, David C. Webb. 2001

388 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/82c57ab7941bffe267a8b4f6cc7356bcf3c78660

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Citations in the corpus

Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications (2006, background): “In de Meza and Webb (2001), utility takes the form u (W, G) = v (W )−c(G); in Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2007), u (W, G) = v (W − c(G)).”
Observing unobservables: Identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment (2005, neutral): “We test across two models of selection on unobservables: the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model (hereafter “SW”) and the de Meza and Webb (1987; 2001) advantageous selection model (hereafter “DW”).20 Specifically, ro can produce either adverse or advantageous 19 On the other hand,…”
Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data (2012, background): “To our knowledge, advantageous selection was first discussed by Hemenway (1990), who termed it “propitious” selection. de Meza and Webb (2001) provide a theoretical treatment of advantageous selection and its implications for insurance coverage and public policy.”
Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work (2002, background): “As an example of this potentially fruitful dialog between theorists and econometricians, the empirical …ndings by Chiappori-Salanie (1997, 2000) and others that the standard models of insurance do not …t the data well in some insurance markets has led Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997), de Meza and We”
Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case (2006, background): “Related work by de Meza and Webb (2000) studies competitive equilibrium in an insurance market.”
Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Payday Lending (2013, background): “Theory does not rule out either advantageous selection or advantageous incentives (e.g., Bisin and Guaitoli, 2004; Parlour and Rajan, 2001; de Meza and Webb, 2001).”