Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating

By Cheng Wang, Stephen D. Williamson. 2002

142 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/823cb19b7a694a682dfde59f0793727783bea3a6

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Rasmus Lentz
2. Raj Chetty
3. Jeremy Lise

Citations in the corpus

• Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs (2007, unknown): “Our result echoes the finding by Wang and Williamson (2002) who conclude that when unemployed agents have enough self-insurance savings available, in the initial phase of the optimal contract benefits could be back-loaded.”
• Optimal unemployment insurance in an estimated job search model with savings (2009, background): “Wang and Williamson (1999) have studied this question in models with savings.”
• Job Search and Savings: Wealth Effects and Duration Dependence (2005, background): “Several recent papersh 1 0 deal with the insurance aspect, for instance, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Wang and Williamson (1999), and Lentz (2002), where optimal unem- ployment insurance schemes are derived in models where the workers are insured against unemployment via both their own savings and…”