Do Executive Stock Options Encourage Risk-Taking?

By Randolph B. Cohen, B. Hall, Luis M. Viceira. 2000

151 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/820a2afe8173248b4be31723867d61a7379cb478

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

1. J. Bettis
2. John M. Bizjak
3. Jeffrey L. Coles
4. Swaminathan L. Kalpathy
5. Alex Edmans

Citations in the corpus

• The causal effect of option pay on corporate risk management (2016, unknown): “2 See, for example, Guay (1999), Cohen, Hall, and Viceira (2000), Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), Lewellen (2006), Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2009), Dong, Wang, and Xie (2010), Chava and Purnanandam…”
• Performance-vesting provisions in executive compensation (2018, background): “…and Lehn (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993), Haubrich (1994), Guay (1999), Johnson and Tian (2000), Cohen, Hall, and Viceira (2000), Demsetz, and Villalonga (2001), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), and Coles, Lemmon,…”
• Managerial Incentives and Risk-taking (2006, unknown): “This is consistent with numerous recent papers such as Yermack (1995), Hall and Liebman (1998), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Core and Guay (1999, 2002a), Guay (1999), Cohen et al. (2000), Datta et al. (2001), and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), among others.”