Assessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a Portable GPS Civilian Spoofer
By Todd E. Humphreys, B. Ledvina, Mark L. Psiaki, B. O'Hanlon, Paul M. Kintner. 2008
792 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Electrical and Electronic Engineering
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/81807c92b28bc7a74ad42c71de12b1f609a7661a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Todd E. Humphreys
- Gaoxi Xiao
- Insup Lee
- Rongxing Lu
- Athanasios V. Vasilakos
- Minghui Zhu
- Jonathan Petit
- Sangdon Park
In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Todd E. Humphreys
- Daniel P. Shepard
- Jahshan A. Bhatti
- Andrew J. Kerns
- Gaoxi Xiao
- Rongxing Lu
- Athanasios V. Vasilakos
- Minghui Zhu
Citations in the corpus
- Potential Cyberattacks on Automated Vehicles (2015, background): “Then, in function of the category of data considered, different protection strategies are developed.”
- Evaluation of the vulnerability of phasor measurement units to GPS spoofing attacks (2012, background): “1, is an advanced version of the spoofer first described in [5].”
- False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey (2017, background): “Note that PMUs may have the vulnerability since the GPS signal can be spoofed [77]–[81].”
- Time Synchronization Attack in Smart Grid: Impact and Analysis (2013, background): “However, a malicious attacker can modify the sampling time by introducing a forged GPS signal [10].”
- GPS Vulnerability to Spoofing Threats and a Review of Antispoofing Techniques (2012, methodology): “The output bit stream is then combined with the original data by interleaving, and the result of this process is fed to the target receiver [3].”
- Unmanned Aircraft Capture and Control Via GPS Spoofing (2014, methodology): “As a contrast to the so-called proximity spoofing attacks treated in Humphreys et al. (2008) and Shepard et al. (2012b), where the spoofer is effectively colocated with the target receiver, the current paper considers spoofing from a distance, as illustrated in Figure 1.”
- RoboADS: Anomaly Detection Against Sensor and Actuator Misbehaviors in Mobile Robots (2018, background): “Several researchers demonstrated jamming, spoofing, and DoS attacks on sensors including ultrasonic, radar [6], gyroscope [7], GPS [8], and LiDAR [9] on modern robots.”
- Cyber Threats Facing Autonomous and Connected Vehicles: Future Challenges (2017, background): “by Humphreys in the context of CAVs [22].”
- Resilient Linear Classification: An Approach to Deal with Attacks on Training Data (2017, positive): “Furthermore, automobiles and robots, which rely on sensor inputs from global positioning system (GPS), inertial measurement unit (IMU) or wheel speed sensors, can be susceptible on spoong aacks [26, 43, 45].”
- GNSS Spoofing and Detection (2016, methodology): “Military uses encrypted signals that make properly secured receivers invulnerable to the spoofer of [5], but a technique known as meaconing could be used to mount a spoofing-like attack against such receivers.”