Evaluation of the vulnerability of phasor measurement units to GPS spoofing attacks

By Daniel P. Shepard, Todd E. Humphreys, Aaron A. Fansler. Int. J. Crit. Infrastructure Prot., 2012

326 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Control and Systems Engineering, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Nuclear and High Energy Physics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4597494adb10a0e952377af5d4f9c7f4cb372ee3

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

1. Daniel P. Shepard
2. Jahshan A. Bhatti
3. Andrew J. Kerns
4. Todd E. Humphreys

Citations in the corpus

• Unmanned Aircraft Capture and Control Via GPS Spoofing (2014, methodology): “As a contrast to the so-called proximity spoofing attacks treated in Humphreys et al. (2008) and Shepard et al. (2012b), where the spoofer is effectively colocated with the target receiver, the current paper considers spoofing from a distance, as illustrated in Figure 1.”
• Cyber Threats Facing Autonomous and Connected Vehicles: Future Challenges (2017, background): “, and by their own admission, is the only GPS spoof reported in open literature which is capable of precisely generating counterfeit GPS signals [20].”