Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism

By Valeri V. Nikolaev. 2010

453 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7f7a99cdb745f0ef19529fac50356e246355efad

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Martin Walker
2. Christopher S. Armstrong
3. W. Guay
4. Araceli Mora
5. Joseph P. Weber
6. Beng Wee Goh
7. Dan Li
8. Mingzhi Liu

In Strategy and Management

1. Christopher S. Armstrong
2. Martin Walker
3. W. Guay
4. Joseph P. Weber
5. Araceli Mora
6. Dan Li
7. Mingzhi Liu
8. Beng Wee Goh

Citations in the corpus

• Who Uses Financial Reports and for What Purpose? Evidence from Capital Providers (2014, unknown): “The literature suggests a certain role for conservatism in contracting, generally suggesting improvements in contracting efficiency are associated with greater conservatism (Beatty et al., 2008, 2012; Nikolaev, 2010; Caskey and Hughes, 2012; Vasvari, 2012).”
• The Confounding Effect of Cost Stickiness on Conservatism Estimates (2016, unknown): “financial distress (Zhang, 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008; Nikolaev, 2010).”
• Do Rating Agencies Cater? Evidence from Rating-Based Contracts (2015, unknown): “Public bondholders will have a greater demand for timely loss recognition than banks or other private lenders (Nikolaev 2010).”
• The implications of research on accounting conservatism for accounting standard setting (2015, background): “Nikolaev (2010) finds that firms with more extensive use of debt covenants in public debt contracts exhibit higher levels of conditional conservatism.”
• Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective (2016, unknown): “For example, Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris (2002) and Nikolaev (2010) provide evidence consistent with more conservative financial reporting enhancing the efficiency of negative covenants in bond indentures by mitigating bondholdershareholder conflicts of interest.”
• The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “Beatty, Weber, and Yu (2008) and Nikolaev (2008) investigate the relationship between the extent to which firms provide conservative financial reports and attributes of the firm’s financial covenants.”
• Internal Controls and Conditional Conservatism (2011, background): “…are shaped, in part, by a firm’s contracting and governance environment (e.g., Ball et al. 2000; Basu et al. 2001; Ball 2001; Ball et al. 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Ahmed and Duellman 2007; LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; LaFond and Watts 2008; Nikolaev 2010).”
• Accounting Conservatism and Firm Investment Efficiency (2016, unknown): “'s (2010) ratio, which we designate as CONS1⁄4CR, builds on the return decomposition model of Vuolteenaho (2002). CR is a measure of conditional conservatism that shows the proportion of the total shock to current and expected future earnings recognized in current year earnings.”
• Corporate Social Responsibility and the Cost of Corporate Bonds (2015, methodology): “Following Nikolaev (2010), we consider 36 covenant restrictions (payout related, investment related, financing related, accounting related, and other”