Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources

By Arun Agrawal. 2001

2,091 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Global and Planetary Change

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7f5acffd9c4fb7c45cb15d7d8dab79c9d53c32eb

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Citations in the corpus

Socioeconomic factors influencing customary marine tenure in the Indo-Pacific (2005, positive): “Agrawal (2001, 2002) suggests that purposively selecting sites that have variation in theoretically significant variables is a defensible sampling methodology in a common-property research context.”
The role of fairness and benefit distribution in community-based Payment for Environmental Services interventions: A case study from Menabe, Madagascar☆ (2010, background): “Inmany rural communities, itmaynot be possible explicitly to direct incentives to the relative poor without upsetting local social structures (Agrawal, 2001; Thompson and Homewood, 2002).”
In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action (2004, neutral): “Lists of important variables differ (Agrawal, 2001).”
On the ‘Efficient Boundaries of the State’: The Contribution of Transaction-Costs Economics to the Analysis of Decentralization and Devolution in Natural Resource Management (2004, methodology): “…missions, rules versus discretion, and division of labour within government and between government and (7) Studies on community-based NRM often consider the state as one among several variables of the èxternal environment', alongside external markets and technology (Agrawal, 2001, page 1659).”
The Tragedy of the Grabbed Commons: Coercion and Dispossession in the Global Land Rush (2017, background): “…of common-property systems varies (Berkes et al., 1989), empirical evidence has shown that sustainable governance of the commons is possible (Agrawal, 2001) and has highlighted the positive socioenvironmental features of these systems, including reduction of the negative environmental…”
Do community-conserved areas effectively conserve biological diversity? Global insights and the Indian context. (2010, background): “, 2001), high dependence on ecosystem services, autonomy that allows local communities to craft locally relevant institutional arrangements,well-defined boundaries and tenurial security (Sudtongkong andWebb, 2008; Rai and Uhl, 2004; Agrawal, 2001).”
Payments for biodiversity conservation in the context of weak institutions:Comparison of three programs from Cambodia? (2010, positive): “The conditions under which institutions for collective management of common-pool resources are likely to be formed have been well articulated through several decades of research (Agrawal, 2001; National Research Council, 2002; Ostrom, 1990).”
Rural livelihoods and poverty reduction policies. (2005, neutral): “One of the difficulties encountered in community-based management in the region’s fisheries is that lake-side villages, far from being the homogenous and clearly bounded entities considered ideal for the establishment of functional common property resource management regimes (Agrawal 2001), actually”
Empowerment and Institutions: Managing Fisheries in Uganda (2006, background): “Multiple conditions for successful management of common property resources by local users, or communities, have been identified and discussed in the literature (Agrawal, 2001; Fabricius, 2004; Oström, 1990).”
Explaining success and failure in the commons: the configural nature of Ostrom's institutional design principles (2016, background): “Nonetheless, DPs may require further unpacking because many are actually combinations of multiple factors themselves (Agrawal 2001).”
Collective action initiatives to improve marketing performance: Lessons from farmer groups in Tanzania (2009, methodology): “Agrawal (2001) synthesized these works in an effort to identify a common list of enabling conditions for successful collective action outcomes.”
Trust, confidence, and equity affect the legitimacy of natural resource governance (2016, background): “These characteristics include small resource systems, homogeneous resource users, and locally devised rules (Ostrom 1990, Agrawal 2001).”
Adaptation to climate change in the developing world (2003, background): “From research on collective action (Agrawal, 2001) it is clear that the size of the group undertaking the collective action, the boundaries of the resource at risk, the homogeneity of the decision-making group, the distribution of benefits of management, and other factors are all important in determ”