The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India

By Timothy J. Besley, Robin Burgess. 2002

1,746 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7f15ca64dc46114491694d80e15ca3169be8ad94

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Citations in the corpus

Persuasion: Empirical Evidence (2010, background): “Besley & Burgess (2002) show that aid to Indian states from 1958 to 1992 responds more to food shortages and floods in areas with higher newspaper circulation per capita (controlling for income and other demographics).”
Does Information Lead to More Active Citizenship? Evidence from an Education Intervention in Rural Kenya (2014, neutral): “ Besley and Burgess (2002) examine government responsiveness to food production shortfalls in India and find that state governments respond more aggressively where 7 newspaper circulation (and presumably, the flow of information) is higher.”
The size and development of the shadow economy: An empirical investigation from states of India (2006, neutral): “Besley and Burgess (2002) show that state governments are more responsive to falls in food production and crop damage in those states where newspaper circulation is higher and electoral accountability is greater.”
Fiscal storms: public spending and revenues in the aftermath of natural disasters (2011, background): “Besley and Burgess (2002) observe that flood impacts in India are negatively correlated with newspaper distribution and therefore political accountability; and Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) reach similar conclusions regarding the response of US disaster aid to media reports.”
Learning About Voter Rationality (2018, neutral): “…Almendares and Le Bihan (2015), Ashworth (2005, 2006), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006, 2008), Banks and Sundaram (1993), Besley (2006), Besley and Burgess (2002), Besley and Prat (2006), Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001), Coate (2004), Daley and Snowberg (2011), Eggers (2017),…”
Rooting Out Corruption or Rooting for Corruption? The Heterogeneous Electoral Consequences of Scandals* (2015, result): “Although information is a clear requirement to ensure responsibility (Besley and Burgess, 2002), and in some cases improves accountability (Ferraz and Finan, 2008), recent studies have found that information about corruption might simply reduce participation in the electoral process (Chong et al.”
Charity hazard—A real hazard to natural disaster insurance? (2007, positive): “Besley and Burgess (2002) find similar results for governmental food distribution after crop flood damage using panel data from India.”
State Ownership, Socio-political Factors, and Labor Cost Stickiness (2018, background): “Election years affect the behavior of ruling governments (Besley & Burgess, 2002).”
Does the World Economy Swing National Elections (2009, positive): “Some insight into why the media might be important is given in Besley and Burgess (2002), who find that Indian state governments provide calamity relief in a more timely fashion when newspaper circulation is higher and there is more electoral competition.”
Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement, and Local Public Goods: Evidence from Mexico (2014, background): “In an empirical evaluation of Sen’s (1981) influential hypothesis that democracy prevents famines, Besley and Burgess (2002) have shown that Indian states with greater freedom of the press are more likely to deliver disaster relief.”
Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of a Community-Based Monitoring Project in Uganda (2007, positive): “With few exceptions, this literature studies the relationships of accountability of politicians to citizens and deal with one (periodic elections) mechanism through which citizens can make politicians and policymakers accountable (see for instance Strömberg, 2004; Besley and Burgess, 2002; Ferraz an”