Overinvestment in Team Sports Leagues: A Contest Theory Model
By Helmut M. Dietl, E. Franck, Markus Lang. 2008
135 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7d97ddf55ef8a65b66d961706f11fa73d4df8931
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Citations in the corpus
- Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member's Association Governance Structures in European Football (2010, unknown): “3 Starting with Franck and Müller (2000), we have tried to formalize the basic trade-offs of “football overinvestment” in Dietl and Franck (2000), Dietl, Franck, and Roy (2003) and Dietl, Franck, and Lang (2008).”
- The market for football club investors: a review of theory and empirical evidence from professional European football (2017, background): “He suggests that in the overinvestment environment of European football (Dietl et al., 2008), football clubs generate a competitive advantage through superior spending power rather than profitability.”
- Europe’s Elite Football: Financial Growth, Sporting Success, Transfer Investment, and Private Majority Investors (2016, unknown): “[23] develop a contest-theoretical model to study the problem of overinvestment.”