Primary commodities and war: Congo-Brazzaville's ambivalent resource curse

111 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War (2006, background): “OF THE STATE AS A TARGET Because the production of minerals—particularly oil—tends to swell the state’s coffers, governments in resource-rich countries may provide more attractive targets than governments in resource-poor countries (Englebert & Ron 2004, Fearon 2005, Le Billon 2005a).”
A price worth fighting for? Natural resources and conflict recurrence (2012, background): “Englebert & Ron (2004) argue that the resource curse theory needs to be more fine-tuned to include cases like Congo-Brazzaville.”
Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability (2005, unknown): “Analysts have also moved toward a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between natural resources and political institutions (e.g., Englebert and Ron 2004).”
Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes (2005, background): “Studies that consider the relationship between regime type and civil war include Muller and Weede (1990), Hegre et al. (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Englebert and Ron (2004).”
Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution (2005, background): “Englebert and Ron (2004) argue, for example, that the availability of oil monies facilitated adherence to peace agreements in the Republic of Congo.”