Dynamical organization of cooperation in complex topologies.

By Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes, M. Campillo, Luis Mario Floría, Yamir Moreno. Physical Review Letters, 2006

473 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma, a two-player game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation, whose payoff matrix favors defection. We show that, asymptotically, the population is partitioned into three subsets: individuals that always cooperate (pure cooperators), always defect (pure defectors), and those that intermittently change their strategy. In fact, the size of the later set is the biggest for a wide range of the "stimulus to defect" parameter. While in homogeneous random graphs pure cooperators are grouped into several clusters, in heterogeneous scale-free (SF) networks they always form a single cluster containing the most connected individuals (hubs). Our results give further insights into why cooperation in SF networks is enhanced.

Subfields: Genetics, Sociology and Political Science, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7cbafa1cdc5ae050d8a9217ea6e7db209dac67b7

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In Genetics

  1. Matjaz Perc
  2. Attila Szolnoki
  3. Zhen Wang
  4. Stefano Boccaletti
  5. Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes
  6. Benjamin Allen
  7. Martin A. Nowak
  8. Sebastian Weber

In Sociology and Political Science

  1. Matjaz Perc
  2. Attila Szolnoki
  3. Zhen Wang
  4. Stefano Boccaletti
  5. Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes
  6. Benjamin Allen
  7. Vito Latora
  8. Martin A. Nowak

In Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

  1. Matjaz Perc
  2. M. A. Porter
  3. Alex Arenas
  4. Manlio De Domenico
  5. Zhen Wang
  6. Attila Szolnoki
  7. Stefano Boccaletti
  8. Sebastian Weber

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