A Drawback Of Electoral Competition

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Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States (2010, background): “[18] Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico, [2005], A Drawback of Electoral Competition, Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(6), 1318-1348.”
Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies (2007, background): “Lizzeri and Persico (2005) develop a model where a larger number of parties reduces the support base of each party and raises the incentive of parties to propose targeted transfers to narrow groups instead of broad public goods.”
Competition Over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations (2006, background): “Lizzeri and Persico (2001, 2005) extended the model by assuming that candidates can choose between redistribution and investment in a public good.”
Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India (2017, background): “…are affected by electoral cycles (Rogoff 1990), ethnicity and electoral strategy influence the allocation of public goods (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Lizzeri and Persico 2005; Burgess et al. 2015), and politically connected firms receive more credit and more bailouts (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell…”
Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US (2010, background): “Lizzeri and Persico (2005) is another example.”