Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy
By Kristopher W. Ramsay. International Organization, 2011
181 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Building and Construction, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7c301cb2c2f696e666d17f1b9d6664f5a6143d29
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Building and Construction
- K. Tsui
- Jørgen Juel Andersen
- S. Bermeo
- Markus Brückner
- A. Ciccone
- Jonathan L. Weigel
- Michael L. Ross
- Romain Wacziarg
In Economics and Econometrics
- Michael L. Ross
- S. Bermeo
- Markus Brückner
- Jørgen Juel Andersen
- Romain Wacziarg
- K. Tsui
- Andrea Tesei
- Ruijin Du
Citations in the corpus
- The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When it Tries to Tax Them* (2020, background): “Related studies include Ross (2001); Jensen and Wantchekon (2004); Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006); Dunning (2008); Ramsay (2011); Caselli and Michaels (2013); Brollo et al. (2013); McGuirk (2013); Ferraz and Monteiro (2014); Borge, Parmer, and Torvik (2015); Timmons and Garfias (2015); Chen…”
- A novel hybrid method of forecasting crude oil prices using complex network science and artificial intelligence algorithms (2018, background): “…out internationally is made more complex by the interplay among many factors — including market supply and demand [2], the US dollar exchange rate [3], speculative trading [4], geopolitical con fl icts [5], and natural disasters [6] — that introduces a high level of noise into the crude oil data.”
- More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries (2011, result): “…negative statistical association between the share of fuel exports in a country’s GDP and democracy.7 More recently, Aslaksen (forthcoming) extends these earlier findings using country fixed-effects estimation; Ramsay (2006) also finds similar results by exploring shortrun variation in oil prices.”
- The Big Oil Change (2014, result): “Why do these findings differ so much from other recent studies, which conclude that there is a resource curse (Andersen & Aslaksen, 2013; Aslaksen, 2010; Cuaresma, Oberhofer, & Raschky, 2010; Fayad, Bates, & Hoeffler, 2011; Ramsay, 2011; Ross, 2012; Tsui, 2010)?”
- The First Law of Petropolitics (2011, background): “A large body of work in political science and economics has sought to demonstrate that resource-abundant countries have worse institutions (notable references, among many others, include Ross 2001; Wantchekon 2002; Ramsay 2011; Tsui 2011).”
- Oil Price Shocks, Income, and Democracy (2012, background): “Ramsey, K. (2009). "Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy.”
- Aid Is Not Oil: Donor Utility, Heterogeneous Aid, and the Aid-Democratization Relationship (2015, background): “For example, see Acemoglu et al. 2008; Boix 2003; Dunning 2008; Epstein et al. 2006; Goldberg, Mvukiyehe, and Wibbels 2008; Haber and Menaldo 2011; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; and Ramsay 2011.”