Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style

By E. Zhuravskaya. 2000

417 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7c01872e2506de498c4dfa4167819cec2f2aebae

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Citations in the corpus

Tax me, but spend wisely? Sources of public finance and government accountability (2015, background): “Similarly Zhuravskaya (2000) provides evidence that outcomes affected by public policy improve when Russian cities keep more of their tax revenues.5 I build on these previous findings by using variations in tax and non-tax revenue that stem from clearly identified sources and considering variations…”
Fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments: Evidence from China (2015, background): “In contrast, the lack of fiscal incentives in Russia explains in part why local governments prey on private businesses (Zhuravskaya, 2000).”
Decentralization and Political Institutions (2007, neutral): “…that help to align politicians’ private interests with public goals are provided by such mechanisms as interjurisdictional competition (Tiebout, 1956; Qian and Roland, 1998; Maskin, Qian, and Xu, 2000) and fiscal autonomy (Jin et al., 1999; Qian and Weingast, 1997; and Zhuravskaya, 2000).”
Do Chinese government subsidies affect firm value (2014, result): “Empirical studies report mixed results, with the influence of local government competition on growth in China being positive but in Russia being negative (Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 2005; Zhuravskaya, 2000).”
Yardstick competition in a Federation: Theory and Evidence from China (2012, background): “Some scholars argue that the latter gave Chinese local o¢ cials strong incentives to promote local economic growth, creating a basis for nationwide high economic performance (Qian and Weingast (1997), Zhuravskaya (2000), Qian (2003) and Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2005)).”
Do External Grants to District Governments Discourage Own Revenue Generation? A Look at Local Public Finance Dynamics in Ghana (2012, background): “For example, Zhuravskaya (2000) establishes such a crowding-out effect in Russia, where each monetary unit raised in own-revenues by a local government is offset by 0.9 units in revenue sources from the higher-tier government, which strongly implies that local governments will have nearly no…”