A Lender-Based Theory of Collateral

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How researchers see this paper

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Collateral, relationship lending and family firms (2010, background): “Also recent theoretical papers by Chen (2006) and Inderst and Mueller (2007) conclude that riskier borrowers will pledge more collateral.”
Real Estate Prices and Firm Capital Structure (2014, methodology): “Positive coe¢ cient on the private placement debt suggest that, constrained rms use collateral value appreciation to ease access to arms length nancing, consistent with the theoretical model of Inderst and Muller (2006). Further, as shown in Panel B, this increase is driven mostly by an increase ”
Collateral and its Substitutes in Emerging Markets' Lending (2012, unknown): “Profits may increase due to a bank’s market power (Hainz, 2003) or due to its information advantage over distant lenders in evaluating credit risk (Inderst and Mueller, 2007).”
Does Collateral Help Mitigate Adverse Selection? A Cross-Country Analysis (2011, unknown): “Inderst and Mueller (2007) adopt a perspective without information asymmetries in which collateral aims to mitigate incentive problems on the part of the lender.”
COLLATERAL AND CREDIT RATIONING: A REVIEW OF RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES AS A GUIDE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH (2009, unknown): “In addition, the consolidation of the banking industry as well as the introduction of the Basel II Capital Accord seem to predict that, in the future, informationally opaque firms will have to rely even more on collateral3 (Inderst and Mueller, 2007).”