Comparative Politics and Public Finance
By Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland, Guido Tabellini. Journal of Political Economy, 2000
796 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7abdb2aa09a978dda2acf5a084d9349edaef7319
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Daron Acemoglu
- Toke S. Aidt
- James A. Robinson
- Guido Tabellini
- Torsten Persson
- Jørgen Juel Andersen
- S. Aslaksen
- Philip E. Keefer
In Political Science and International Relations
- Guido Tabellini
- Torsten Persson
- Daron Acemoglu
- Stefan Voigt
- James A. Robinson
- Oriol Roca‐Sagalés
- Leonel Muinelo‐Gallo
- Philip E. Keefer
Citations in the corpus
- Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments (2007, neutral): “In later work, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (1999) elaborate on this framework to gain insights into institutional determinants of public finance characteristics such as the size of the public sector.”
- Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress* (2008, background): “Recent applications of this legislative bargaining model include comparative politics (Persson et al., 2000), federalism (Besley and Coate, 2003; Lockwood, 2002), intergovernmental transfers (Knight, 2002), legislative elections (Chari et al.”
- Political Economy of Mechanisms (2008, methodology): “Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gerard; Tabellini, Guido (2000) “Comparative Politics and Public Finance,” Journal of Political Economy, 108(6), 1121-61.”
- Constitutions and the resource curse (2008, background): “We begin by following Persson (2005), assuming that Western colonization a¤ects current policies, and thereby growth, only through the form of political institutions.”
- The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence (2004, neutral): “Stigler (1971), Pelzman (1976), and Becker (1983) are related seminal works on the political economy of policy determination.”
- Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey (2003, background): “…theories of corruption discussed in this section emphasise that the reward to corruption as perceived by a particular individual depends critically on how many other individuals in the same 16 The choice of the election system can also affect corruption levels (Myerson, 1993, Persson et al., 2000).”
- Does the Size of the Legislature Affect the Size of Government? Evidence from Two Natural Experiments (2012, neutral): “12 Persson et al. (2007), for example, use theory as a guide to instrumental variable selection.”
- Technology Diffusion: Measurement, Causes and Consequences (2014, background): “Following the seminal work of Solow (1956), there is a wide consensus that advances in technology are a key source of economic growth over the long term.”
- Joint determinants of fiscal policy, income inequality and economic growth (2013, methodology): “22 For an introduction to SURE estimation methodology, see Zellner (1962, 1963) and Zellner and Huang (1962). 23 See Greene (2003), Kmenta (1997) and Zellner and Theil (1962) for references on 3SLS estimation methodology.”