Fee Speech: Signaling, Risk-Sharing, and the Impact of Fee Structures on Investor Welfare

By Sanjiv Ranjan Das, Rangarajan K. Sundaram. 2002

145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/795c3a52dc5afa1a33d5a3c60b6281e6917b1d5e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Vikas Agarwal
2. Narayan Naik
3. Naveen D. Daniel
4. Nicolas P. B. Bollen
5. Gwen Yu
6. Ilia D. Dichev
7. Tarun Ramadorai
8. Andrew J. Patton

In Finance

1. Narayan Naik
2. Vikas Agarwal
3. Naveen D. Daniel
4. Melvyn Teo
5. Andrew J. Patton
6. Nicolas P. B. Bollen
7. Martin Eling
8. Veronika K. Pool

Citations in the corpus

• Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry (2019, unknown): “24 We note that Das and Sundaram (2002) develop a model on the tradeoff between the signaling and risk-sharing properties of symmetric (i.”
• Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance (2009, background): “Recent theoretical work by Das and Sundaram (2002) suggests that higher incentive fee should result in better performance; however, the empirical evidence on this is mixed at best.”