What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation

By Austan Goolsbee. Journal of Political Economy, 2000

377 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence (2008, positive): “In the context of labor income taxation, the model predicts that high income households are more likely to respond to labor and capital income taxes because the stakes are larger for them, consistent with evidence in Feldstein (1995), Goolsbee (2000), and Saez (2004).”
The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Income: A Panel Study of 'Bracket Creep' (2003, methodology): “Gruber and Saez (2000) provide some evidence along this line.”
The Evolution of High Incomes in Northern America: Lessons from Canadian Evidence (2005, background): “Goolsbee (2000) found similar effects for the U.S. tax increase of 1993.”
Taxation and Economic Efficiency (2001, background): “Consequently, the reaction of short-term taxable income to a tax change may exceed the reaction of the present value of taxable income, which Goolsbee (2000) finds occurred with executive compensation in response to the 1993 U.S. tax change.”
Research Commentary - Too Big to Fail: Large Samples and the p-Value Problem (2013, background): “Examples of the use of a CI or one of its bounds can be found in many papers in different empirical ﬁelds (Black and Strahan 2002, Goolsbee 2000, Goolsbee and Guryan 2006, Iglesias and Riboud 1988, Vissing-Jørgensen 2002).”