Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing

By Rui A. Albuquerque, Neng Wang. 2008

272 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7906e55f15e53b14051458cfe1c9693cb5024c1d

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In Accounting

1. Yuan Huang
2. Zhihong Chen
3. Kuo-chiang Wei
4. G. Clementi
5. R. Castro
6. Glenn MacDonald
7. Dev R. Mishra
8. Omrane Guedhami

In Finance

1. G. Clementi
2. R. Castro
3. Yuan Huang
4. Kuo-chiang Wei
5. Glenn MacDonald
6. Zhihong Chen
7. Dev R. Mishra

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics (2012, unknown): “Agency conflicts between the manager and shareholders are introduced by considering that each firm is run by a manager who can capture a fraction φ ∈ [0, 1) of free cash flow to equity as private benefits (as in La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002), Lambrecht and Myers (2008), or ”
• Investor Protection, Equity Returns, and Financial Globalization (2009, unknown): “In Albuquerque and Wang (2008), expected returns are a decreasing function of investor protection because investment increases when investor protection is poor.”
• Endogenous Technological Progress and the Cross Section of Stock Returns (2012, unknown): “Notably, Albuquerque and Wang (2008) use investment speci c technological change to examine asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection at aggregate level.”
• Executive Pay Disparity and the Cost of Equity Capital (2013, background): “1 Albuquerque and Wang (2008) and Garmaise and Liu (2005) suggest that entrenched managers increase a firm’s systematic risk because they overinvest to gain private benefits.”
• Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development (2009, background): “Albuquerque and Wang (2004) look at the assetpricing implications.”
• Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital (2010, unknown): “Since, in their model, the equity risk premium is positively associated with the volatility of investment output, Albuquerque and Wang (2008) imply that weaker investor protection suggests a higher equity risk premium (or a higher cost of equity).”