EXISTENCE OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF TRADERS

By R. Aumann. Classics in Game Theory, 2020

494 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Abstract : It is well known, and easy to establish, that there exist markets that do not have competitive equilibria, provided the traders do not have convex preferences--that is, that the set of commodity bundles preferred or indifferent to a given bundle is not always convex. It is proved, nevertheless, that in a market consisting of a continuum of traders, each one individually insignificant, there is always a competitive equilibrium, even when the preferences are not convex. (Author)

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/784d941645fefcdefaeccf0a4df4fac941cb4f56

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Citations in the corpus

Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer (2003, background): “Aumann [3] gave a famous proof of Walras equilibrium without quasi-concavity (and without production) for an economy with a continuum of agents.”
The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2010, background): “At the University of Chicago's Booth School of Business, which adopted a BPM in 2008, the number of students allocated zero courses in the main round of course bidding has been 17, 64, 37, and 53 over the past four quarters, respectively.(14) [insert statistics on the amount of budget students have ”
Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players (2002, methodology): “” In Aumann (1964) four methodological points are made explicit.”
Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information (2000, background): “It is well known that if (A.1) and (A.3) are satisfied, thenC(E(ω))6=∅, for all ω∈Ω (see, e.g., Aumann, 1964, 1966, and Hildenbrand, 1968, 1974).”