Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense

By Karen Neander. 1991

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Citations in the corpus

DARWIN IN THE MADHOUSE: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2000, unknown): “The natural way for philosophers to understand the function of a psychological mechanism, according to the conception of the mind we have presented, is in causalhistorical terms (Millikan 1993, Neander 1991).”
Defining Dysfunction: Natural Selection, Design, and Drawing a Line* (2007, background): “…of Boorse that use examples of common disease, which emphasize that a nonetiological account of function like his has trouble explaining how a trait-type continues to have the function F in situations where all (or almost all) trait-tokens fail to do F (Millikan 1989, 300; Neander 1991, 182–183).”
How biologists conceptualize genes: An empirical study (2004, background): “This approach can be extended to technical concepts, since any philosopher of biology should be in a position to consult his or her intuitions as a biologically literate sample of one (Neander, 1991).”
The teleological notion of ‘function’ (1991, background): “I will not be directly concerned with functional norms in this paper, although in other places [17, 19] I have argued that functional norms also require an etiological theory of functions.”
Functional Analysis and Proper Functions (1993, methodology): “Neander (1991) has effectively defended the approach against the criticisms directed by Boorse [1976], Prior [1985] and Bigelow and Pargetter [1978] against the early etiological theory of Wright [1973], [1976].”