Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
By Anton Kolotilin. 2018
182 citations recorded by the source corpus.
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I provide conditions under which interval revelation is optimal. Finally, I show that the expected utilities are not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4b3a0b06d8d45544daa43d9e9ca96d88810873e
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Dirk Bergemann
- Stephen Morris
- Giorgio Martini
- Philipp Strack
- Benny Moldovanu
- Piotr Dworczak
- Hyun Song Shin
- Itay Goldstein
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Dirk Bergemann
- Stephen Morris
- Giorgio Martini
- Philipp Strack
- Benny Moldovanu
- Piotr Dworczak
- Andreas Kleiner
- Roman M. Sheremeta
In Safety Research
- Dirk Bergemann
- Stephen Morris
- Giorgio Martini
- Philipp Strack
- Benny Moldovanu
- Piotr Dworczak
- Roman M. Sheremeta
- P. Geraats
Citations in the corpus
- The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion (2019, background): “Kolotilin (2018) uses duality theory to characterize the optimal persuasion scheme in a relatedmodel and introduces the idea of prices for messages in the context of an example.”
- Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019, background): “Kolotilin, Li, Mylovanov, and Zapechelnyuk (2017) refer to this informational environment as "private persuasion".14 Kolotilin (2017) pursues a linear programming approach to identify the optimal information disclosure policy under a single-crossing assumption. A decision rule now specifies the prob”
- Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications (2020, background): “Persuasion With Preferences Over the Posterior Mean We consider here the persuasion problem studied by Kolotilin (2018) and Dworczak and Martini (2019).”