The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 x 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria

By Richard D. McKelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey, Roberto A. Weber. 2000

125 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/76799440c3f6ac7a02cba7bbde4e5aa9d377d99a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. Charles A. Holt
2. Jacob K. Goeree
3. Thomas R. Palfrey

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Thomas R. Palfrey
2. Jacob K. Goeree
3. Charles A. Holt
4. Nagore Iriberri
5. Vincent P. Crawford
6. Miguel A. Costa-Gomes
7. Ernst Fehr
8. Klaus M. Schmidt

In Safety Research

1. Thomas R. Palfrey
2. Jacob K. Goeree
3. Charles A. Holt
4. Ernst Fehr
5. Nagore Iriberri
6. Vincent P. Crawford
7. Klaus M. Schmidt
8. Roman M. Sheremeta

Citations in the corpus

• Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (2005, methodology): “The own-payoff effect predicted by regular QRE accords with data from laboratory experiments that employ an asymmetric matching-pennies structure, e.g. Ochs (1995), McKelvey et al. (2000), Goeree and Holt (2001), and Goeree et al. (2003).”
• Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal Form Games (2008, unknown): “…in the literature (in the context of normal-form games see, among others, Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995, Nagel, 1995, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber, 2000, Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta, 2001, Weizsäcker, 2003, Goeree and Holt, 2004, and Camerer, Ho, and Chong,…”