Financial incentives and endogenous enforcement in China's pollution levy system
By Hua Wang, David Wheeler. 2005
270 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/75f6aae3c05a3afeede3be158f8002c17cbf5275
How researchers see this paper
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Rongbing Huang
- Danping Chen
- Mary E. Lovely
- Judith M. Dean
- M. Maung
- Craig Wilson
- Xiaobo Tang
- Hua Wang
In Strategy and Management
- Rongbing Huang
- Danping Chen
- Hua Wang
- Mary E. Lovely
- Judith M. Dean
- M. Maung
- Craig Wilson
- Xiaobo Tang
Citations in the corpus
- Are Foreign Investors Attracted to Weak Environmental Regulations? Evaluating the Evidence from China (2005, background): “…use and waste water discharge; pollutant concentrations in waste water; 4) waste gas volume and air pollutant concentrations (before and after treatment); 5) noise pollution by source; 6) 39 The material in this appendix is drawn from Wang and Wheeler (2005), where additional details can be found.”
- Spatial heterogeneity of economic development and industrial pollution in urban China (2013, unknown): “Studies have reported that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the major polluters since many of them are in the pollution intensive industries and also enjoy more bargain power with local governments (Wang and Jin 2007; Wang and Wheeler 2005).”
- Does Environmental Information Disclosure Benefit Waste Discharge Reduction? Evidence from China (2014, background): “Similarly, the administrative penalty of polluting enterprises (SAC) can reduce excessive waste emissions (Dasgupta et al. 2001; Jiang and McKibbin 2002; Wang and Wheeler 2005).”
- Political Connections and Industrial Pollution: Evidence Based on State Ownership and Environmental Levies in China (2016, background): “2014), substantial differences in actual implementation (whether through lower rates or under-estimation of pollution amounts) arise among different provinces, with some provinces even having lower realized pollution fees than the national minimum (Wang and Wheeler 2005).”
- Transboundary pollution in China: a study of polluting firms' location choices in Hebei province (2013, unknown): “In addition, although stateowned enterprises have more bargaining power with local authorities in terms of the charges they pay (Wang and Wheeler, 2005), environmental policy also has a significant impact on them (Wang et al.”