Disclosure by Politicians

By Simeon Djankov, R. La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes, A. Shleifer. 2010

213 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/75cb8c21c4508731f294bb3bacad19a6f4b220e7

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Sociology and Political Science

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

The Real Effects of Political Uncertainty: Elections and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Prices (2010, background): “…to which corruption is perceived to exist in the public and political sectors; POL_DISCL, the measure of public disclosure by politicians from Djankov et al. (2009) 31 ; STATE, the index of the prevalence of state ownership and control from EIU; 30 There are fewer countries in Table VII than…”
Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, background): “9 We refer the readers to Faccio (2006, 2010) for a more comprehensive description of the political connections database. 10 http://www.economist.com/node/587107 11 We follow Hail and Leuz (2006) and estimate the cost of equity for the fiscal year-end month plus ten.”
Social Capital and Political Accountability (2010, unknown): “Additionally, the findings of our paper are consistent with those of Djankov et al. (2010), who find results according to which financial”
Public Procurement in Law and Practice (2020, unknown): “2018), political connections as channels for corruption (Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006), transparency of politicians’ incomes as a barrier to corruption (Djankov et al. 2010; Banerjee, Hanna, and Mullainathan 2012), or administrative design to reduce bribes (Bertrand et al.”
Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works (2018, unknown): “…regression analysis of rules governing legislators’ disclosure of financial information and conflicts of interest across 175 countries, Djankov et al. (2010) find that disclosure requirements are associated with lower levels of perceived corruption, but only if information disclosed…”
Does Transparency Lead to Pay Compression? (2017, methodology): “…in lower manager compensation if capture andmanagerial power are restrained.3 Consistent with this hypothesis, using survey data from across 175 countries, Djankov et al. (2010) find that public disclosure of politicians’ income is associated with lower perceived corruption and better government.”
What Do Corruption Indices Measure (2014, background): “9 A recent paper by Djankov et al. (2009) explicitly studies corruption perceptions and argues that accountability rules will affect the information available to observers.”
Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, unknown): “Third, we control for several additional country-level factors that capture: openness to international trade (OPENNESS); the level of freedom of the press (NEWSPAPER), which measures the extent of public opinion pressure according to Dyck and Zingales (2004); the risk of state expropriation (PREDATI”
Corruption in Developing Countries (2012, unknown): “In a cross-sectional, cross-country study, Djankov et al (2010) study the relationship between disclosure rules for information about parliament members and a numbers of measures of quality of government and corruption.”
Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies (2011, background): “These results suggest that public policies such as mandatory provision of information about politicians may significantly improve governance in low income countries (on this, also see Djankov et al. (2010)).”