The Calculus of Selfishness

By Karl Sigmund. 2010

398 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/75881797a0747ac500336d8ede2afeae1cb14b63

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Citations in the corpus

Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game (2010, background): “Although selfishness and competitiveness are an inherent part of human nature, field studies and experiments attest to the fact that humans are willing to cooperate if the conditions are right [1].”
Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review (2014, background): “Like by the evolution of cooperation [85], in the games of cyclic dominance, the evolutionary game theory [86–90] is also proving to be the theory of choice for the study of these beautifully simple yet fascinating systems.”
Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium (2015, background): “Almost simultaneously with network science, in evolutionary game theory [8–11] leaps of progress have also been made, largely due to interdisciplinary approaches that link together knowledge from biology, sociology, economics as well as mathematics, physics and psychology [12–21].”
Imitating emotions instead of strategies in spatial games elevates social welfare (2011, background): “Let us enter evolutionary games [2–4], which are frequently employed to help us reveal and understand the mechanisms and reasons why cooperation nevertheless prevails and is in fact much more common than one could assume.”
EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE UNDER COLLECTIVE-RISK DILEMMAS (2012, methodology): “Here we address these problems resorting to a simple mathematical model, adopting unusual concepts within political and sustainability science research, such as peer-influence and evolutionary game theory.(14,43,44) As a result we encompass several of the key elements stated before regarding the cli”
Giving Versus Giving In (2014, background): “Even behaviors that are costly to the giver may still by self-interested if one expects to interact with the other party repeatedly in the future, otherwise many gains will be foregone by setting up a long history of non-cooperation (Binmore & Samuelson, 1992; Fudenberg &Maskin, 1986; Nowak, 2006; S”
Norm Perception as a Vehicle for Social Change (2016, background): “Experiments by game theorists show that individuals are willing to use their own money to punish others who go against a norm of cooperation (Sigmund, 2010).”
Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment (2017, background): “In the absence of a limited interaction range the behavior is largely trivial and resembles that reported before for the traditional two-strategy public goods game [29, 55].”