Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure

By Phillip C. Stocken. 2000

325 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/73c9eb10b4d55f27741648dc48116fe7fe78bf55

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Citations in the corpus

Societal Trust and Management Earnings Forecasts (2020, background): “On the one hand, managers issue forecasts to reduce information asymmetry (Coller and Yohn 1997), and the effectiveness of management forecasts in reducing information asymmetry depends primarily on their perceived credibility (Stocken 2000; Mercer 2004; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Ng et al. 2013).”
Capital Structure, Cost of Capital, and Voluntary Disclosures (2011, background): “…(1991) for an early survey of this literature, and Nachman 3But, the present model and KLM share the important property that the disclosure of information has real effects, which is also true of a substantial part of the disclosure literature (e.g., Kanodia et al. 2000; Stocken 2000; Pae 2002).”
Do Unverifiable Disclosures Matter? Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Lending (2012, unknown): “These results can be interpreted as being consistent with a desire of borrowers to develop a reputation for truth telling in their disclosures so that they can continue to benefit from using these disclosures in future loan listings (Stocken 2000).”
Beyond the Numbers: Measuring the Information Content of Earnings Press Release Language (2011, background): “The importance of an observable reporting event that is sufficiently useful for assessing the credibility of managers’ voluntary disclosures via ex-post evaluation both has been demonstrated in theoretical research (e.g., Stocken 2000) and has been observed in archival research.”
Prior Forecasting Accuracy and Investor Reaction to Management Earnings Forecasts (2009, unknown): “4 Likewise, in a theoretical study of the credibility of management earnings forecasts, Stocken (2000) shows that a manager’s forecasting reputation is a function of both the accuracy and length of the manager’s prior earnings forecasting record in a multi-period equilibrium.”
Reputation management and the disclosure of earnings forecasts (2012, unknown): “The present paper differs from the existing models of disclosure that address reputation-related concerns, almost all of which involve ‘‘cheap talk’’ (for example, Sobel 1985; Benabou and Laroque 1992; Stocken 2000; Morris 2001) in three ways.”
Management Forecasts in Japan: An Empirical Study of Forecasts that are Effectively Mandated (2009, background): “11 Stocken (2000) shows that even when managers’ disclosures are cheap talk, in a multi-period setting reputational considerations may be sufficient to induce managers to provide truthful (unbiased forecasts).”
Soft information in earnings announcements: news or noise? (2008, background): “More directly related to our setting, Stocken (2000) models managerial incentives to disclose privately observed non-verifiable information and predicts that credible communication is less probable for a manager with poor reputation.”
The contents of assurance statements for sustainability reports and information asymmetry (2017, background): “development of the management’s reputation (Stocken 2000).”
Audited Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure as Complements: A Test of the Confirmation Hypothesis (2012, unknown): “Stocken (2000) investigates disclosures in the context of financing an investment project.”
A theory of voluntary disclosure and cost of capital (2013, background): “One can also view η as a proxy for the complexity of the economic operations to be disclosed or whether a firm lacks sufficient credibility for truthful disclosure (Stocken (2000)).”