Inequality, Control Rights, and Rent Seeking: Sugar Cooperatives in Maharashtra

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Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation (2002, background): “…to explain why forms of industrial organization may depend on wealth inequality, and why worker cooperatives may occasionally perform superior to capitalist firms [Banerjee and Newman (1993); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1994, 1995), Patrick Legros and Newman (1996); Banerjee et al. (2001)].”
Success in High Value Horticultural Export Markets for the Small Farmers: The Case of Mahagrapes in India (2008, background): “Similarly, Bannerjee et al. (2001) present evidence for rent seeking and elite capture by the management of sugar cooperatives in Maharashtra.”
Market inefficiencies and the adoption of agricultural technologies in developing countries 1 (2013, background): “Within a farmer organization, inequality of asset ownership affects how much of the profit different members are able to extract, an effect that has been shown to increase with heterogeneity in wealth (Banerjee et al. 2001).”
Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say? (2000, background): “Allowing X to vary also implies that the causal effects of inequality will vary with financial development (which is how Barro (2000) explains his results).”