Participatory Politics, Social Cooperation, and Economic Stability

By Dani Rodrik. 2000

214 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Few would doubt the proposition that political institutions matter for economic development. Yet robust generalizations and systematic evidence on how exactly they do so are lacking. In this paper, attention is drawn to regularity in the cross-national data that has received little attention to date: participatory political regimes are associated with significantly lower levels of aggregate economic instability. After presenting some of the evidence, it is speculated that the reason has to do with the propensity of democracy to moderate social conflict and induce compromise. Three distinct arguments as to why this may be the case are presented.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/739de21ebd3de3cad72f7dc79ac9df3677e52cd8

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. C. Santiso
2. Heitor Almeida
3. Daniel Ferreira
4. A. M. Mobarak

In Sociology and Political Science

1. C. Santiso
2. Heitor Almeida
3. Daniel Ferreira
4. A. M. Mobarak
5. Melanie Morten

Citations in the corpus

• Does Capital Account Liberalization Lead To Growth (2008, unknown): “Rodrik,2000,pp.28 ‐34;AEW,p.11;BHL,2001,pp.14‐16;andEichengreen,”
• Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality (2001, background): “Jonathan Isham Daniel Kaufman, and Lant Pritchett (1997) find that effective citizen voice and public accountability often leads to greater efficacy in government action and a more efficient allocation of resources.”
• Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance (2005, unknown): “This is consistent with the idea that stock returns and ROA are more volatile over time than Q, and that 32 For an example of this approach in a somewhat different context, see Rodrik (2000).”
• Are Crises Good for Long-Term Growth? The Role of Political Institutions (2010, unknown): “Overall, the hypothesis that we test and the results that we obtain are consistent with Rodrik (2000), who argues that democracy yields better policy outcomes because it facilitates intertemporal cooperation between agents through deliberation, rules that that prevent excessive redistribution of…”
• Democracy, Volatility, and Economic Development (2005, background): “It also extends a small literature in economics (Denizer et al. 2002, Easterly et al. 2000) and in political economy (Quinn and Woolley 2001, Nooruddin 2003, Chandra 1998, Rodrik 2000) which focuses on the effects of financial depth and democracy on volatility without explaining mean growth.”
• The Geography of Output Volatility (2009, unknown): “[92] Rodrik, D.”
• Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance (2002, methodology): “Here, Rodrik’s theory is more speciÞc about which type of policies should be more volatile under autocratic governments: they are macroeconomic policies, usually Þscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies. Rodrik measures macroeconomic mismanagement by a combination of increases in the rate of inßat”