Expectations Management and Beatable Targets: How do Analysts React to Explicit Earnings Guidance?

By Julie Cotter, İ. Tuna, Peter D. Wysocki, Jeffrey L. Callen. 2006

466 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/722c7a4d32f7f49268cdd1049128859bade52e05

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Citations in the corpus

The impacts of product market competition on the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures (2010, background): “Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) argue that when investors are unsure about managers’ information endowment, managers are able to withhold even nonproprietary information.”
Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework (2008, unknown): “In terms of factors associated with forecasts with different types of news, research has shown that bad-news forecasts are positively associated with analyst optimism and inversely associated with equity issuance ͑Cotter et al. 2006͒.”
The Market Reward for Achieving Analyst Earnings Expectations: Does Managing Expectations or Earnings Matter? (2011, unknown): “Hutton (2005), Cotter et al. (2006), and Houston et al. (2008) find that managers provide earnings guidance when the company’s information environment is uncertain, earnings are important for valuation, and the investment community’s information demands are high.”
The Effect of Annual Report Readability on Analyst Following and the Properties of Their Earnings Forecasts (2011, unknown): “Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) find that managers guide analysts’ expectations, which also may affect the properties of analyst forecasts.”
IFRS adoption and analysts’ earnings forecasts: Australian evidence (2012, unknown): “, (2007) and Cotter et al., (2006) we include the measure of the extent of earnings guidance provided by firms but this variable is also not significant in models 3 – 6.”
Management Forecast Quality and Capital Investment Decisions (2014, unknown): “…external forecasts to meet an objective other than forecasting accuracy, such as walking down analysts’ earnings expectations, misleading competitors, and manipulating their stock price for insider trading and/or compensation reasons (Cotter et al. 2006; Matsumoto 2002; Aboody and Kasznik 2000).”
Management Earnings Forecasts and Other Forward-Looking Statements (2017, unknown): “Similarly, there is substantial evidence that analysts respond to management forecasts by revising their estimates of future earnings (e.g., Waymire 1986; Jennings 1987; Cotter et al. 2006).”
CEO Overconfidence and Management Forecasting (2016, unknown): “Matsumoto (2002) and Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) suggest that firms use guidance to guide analysts’ forecasts downward to avoid a negative earnings surprise.”
Political contributions and analyst behavior (2015, unknown): “The ‘‘last forecast’’ subsample is motivated by prior research, which shows that analysts issue relatively more optimistic forecasts and ‘‘walk down’’ the forecasts gradually as they approach the end of the fiscal year (Richardson et al. 2004; Cotter et al. 2006).”