Sell your experiences: a market mechanism based incentive for participatory sensing

By Juong-Sik Lee, Baik Hoh. Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications, 2010

391 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Automotive Engineering, Computer Science Applications, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/71c305b95c7088314fa2a8b57ab632af08d72d3d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Automotive Engineering

1. Dusist Niyato
2. Huadong Ma
3. Guoliang Xue
4. Xi Fang
5. Jian Tang
6. Dejun Yang
7. Iordanis Koutsopoulos

In Computer Science Applications

1. Bin Guo
2. Guoliang Xue
3. Xi Fang
4. Dusist Niyato
5. Lionel Ming-shuan Ni
6. Xingshe Zhou
7. Jian Tang
8. Zhiwen Yu

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Ping Wang
2. Bin Guo
3. Zhu Han
4. Guoliang Xue
5. Xi Fang
6. Dusist Niyato
7. Qian Zhang
8. Yanmin Zhu

Citations in the corpus

• Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing: Crowdsourcing With Smartphones (2016, background): “While many researchers have developed different crowdsensing applications [8], [22], they either do not consider the design of incentive mechanisms or have neglected some critical properties of incentive mechanisms.”
• Data Collection and Wireless Communication in Internet of Things (IoT) Using Economic Analysis and Pricing Models: A Survey (2016, methodology): “It means that although the RADP-VPC scheme has the smallest payment, it provides a very low quality data, which makes it difficult for the service provider to ensure the QoS.”
• How to crowdsource tasks truthfully without sacrificing utility: Online incentive mechanisms with budget constraint (2014, background): “Lee and Hoh [11] designed a reverse auction based dynamic incentive mechanism for purchasing users’ sensing data.”
• Mobile Crowd Sensing and Computing (2015, background): “Recently, several game theory approaches [Yang et al. 2012; Lee and Hoh 2010; Huangfu et al. 2013] have been proposed for MCSC to motivate and reward truthful contributions.”
• Crowdsourcing to smartphones: incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing (2012, methodology): “We then present our incentive mechanisms for these two models in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.”
• TRAC: Truthful auction for location-aware collaborative sensing in mobile crowdsourcing (2014, background): “In [17], the users sell sensed data to a service provider and a dynamic pricing scheme is designed to stimulate more participants, thus achieving better quality of service.”