Earnings Manipulation, Pension Assumptions and Managerial Investment Decisions

By Daniel Bergstresser, Mihir A. Desai, Joshua D. Rauh. 2006

349 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Pension Fund Asset Allocation and Liability Discount Rates: Camouflage and Reckless Risk Taking by U.S. Public Plans? (2012, neutral): “…up underfunded pension plans, because firms that are sufficiently overfunded are exempt from the PBGC insurance premiums and pension overfunding reduces the probability of a ratings downgrade in such a way that the value of the firm is increased (Rauh, 2006; Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh, 2006).”
Capital Market-Driven Corporate Finance (2009, background): “In a similar vein, Lamont & Stein (2006) use the differential sensitivity of equity issuance and merger activity to market versus firm-level stock returns.”
How Do Pensions Affect Corporate Capital Structure Decisions (2010, neutral): “Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) show that managers tend to be more aggressive when changes to pension assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings.”
CEO Incentives and Earnings Management (2006, background): “See Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2004) for more information on earnings management in defined benefit pension plans.”
Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation (2006, neutral): “Cohen (2005), Bebchuk et al. (2005), Bergstresser et al. (2006) , Bowen et al. (2004), Christoffersen et al. (2004), Core et al. (2006), Cremers and Nair (2005) and Defond et al. (2005).”
Do Firms Manage Earnings to Meet Dividend Thresholds (2008, neutral): “These studies conclude that firms manage earnings around stock offers (Teoh et al., 1998a, b; Shivakumar, 2000; DuCharme et al., 2004; Bergstresser et al., 2006) and acquisitions (Bergstresser et al., 2006; Louis, 2004).”
Accounting complexity, misreporting, and the consequences of misreporting (2012, background): “For example, research shows that investors and analysts do not understand the effect of changes in pension plan parameters on future earnings (Picconi 2006) and that managers increase rates of return assumptions on pension assets in settings when it benefits the firm or manager (Picconi 2006; Bergs”
Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk (2009, background): “Other studies also find that earnings management responds to payoffs associated with a temporarily high stock price (Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh, 2006; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a, b).”
Underinvestment vs. overinvestment: Evidence from price reactions to pension contributions (2009, methodology): “This fact is possibly caused by a lack of clarity in pension accounting and/or by managers’ practice of using pension items to manipulate earnings, as reported by Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006).”