Financial Reporting Quality, Private Information, Monitoring and the Lease-Versus-Buy Decision

By Anne L. Beatty, Scott Liao, Joseph P. Weber. 2010

194 citations recorded by the source corpus.

ABSTRACT: A flourishing stream of research suggests that liquidity-constrained firms with low accounting quality have limited access to capital for investments. We extend this research by investigating whether these firms are more likely to lease their assets. Lessors’ superior control rights allow them to provide capital to constrained firms with low-quality accounting reports. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that low accounting quality firms have a higher propensity to lease than purchase assets. To verify that leasing does not merely reflect these firms’ desire for off-balance-sheet accounting, we investigate whether banks’ access to private information and monitoring affect the relation between accounting quality and leasing. We find the association between accounting quality and leasing decreases when banks have higher monitoring incentives and when loans contain capital expenditure provisions. These results suggest that other mechanisms can substitute for the role of accounting quality in r...

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/718254d0ac1e96b5c617acbd9ce9f0a0ea2aaafb

How researchers see this paper

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In Accounting

  1. Nemit Shroff
  2. Rodrigo S. Verdi
  3. Christopher S. Armstrong
  4. W. Guay
  5. Joseph P. Weber
  6. S. Roychowdhury
  7. Martin Walker
  8. David F. Larcker

In Strategy and Management

  1. Nemit Shroff
  2. Christopher S. Armstrong
  3. Joseph P. Weber
  4. Rodrigo S. Verdi
  5. W. Guay
  6. S. Roychowdhury
  7. David F. Larcker
  8. Fernando Penalva

Citations in the corpus