Fiscal Policy Cycles and Public Expenditure in Developing Countries

By Ludger Schuknecht. 2000

268 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/712b5bb62a51410d7cb518d4aa33022dcb863ef3

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Citations in the corpus

ELECTORAL AND PARTISAN CYCLES IN ECONOMIC POLICIES AND OUTCOMES (2002, background): “…1992; Alesina et al. 1992, 1997; Krueger & Turan 1993; Schultz 1995; Fouda 1997; Price 1998; Brender 1999; Franzese 1999, 2002a,b; Gonzalez 1999a,b, 2000; Moyo 1999; Schuknecht 1999, 2000; Khemani 2000; Shi & Svensson 2001; Block 2001a,b; Block et al. 2001; Harrinvirta & Mattila 2001; Clark 2002).”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “…and Nieto- Parra and Santiso (2012) for Latin America, Block (2002) for Africa, Hallerberg et al. (2002) for East Europe, Alesina et al. (1997), Mink and de Haan (2006) and Klomp and de Haan (2013a, 2013c) for industrial democracies and Schuknecht (1996, 1999, 2000) for developing countries.”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, unknown): “In contrast, Schuknecht (2000) concludes that capital expenditures, expressed as a share of GDP, were used to influence election outcomes in a group of 24 developing countries for the 1973–1992 period.14 13Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) find that the SGP has generated incentives for creative accounting…”
Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments (2003, background): “In addition, Schuknecht (2000) investigates which fiscal variable is most affected by the timing of elections, using a sample of 24 countries for the 1973–92 period.”
Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures (2011, background): “In addition, the effect of a tax cut on voter welfare is not very direct, immediate and visible, which makes it difficult for governments to reap the political benefits from the resulting economic stimulation ( Schuknecht 2000 ).”
Democracy, Elections and Allocation of Public Expenditure in Developing Countries (2009, background): “higher current expenditure if social assistance needs to rise (Schuknecht, 2000).”
Has the Stability and Growth Pact Impeded Political Budget Cycles in the European Union? (2005, unknown): “Likewise, only competent politicians will be re-elected.”
Public expenditures in Canadian provinces: An empirical study of politico-economic interactions (2006, background): “For instance, patterns of electoral cycles in public expenditures have been observed in France (Aubin, Berdot, Goyeau, & Lafay, 1988), in Japan (Kohno & Nishizawa, 1990), in Canadian provinces (Blais & Nadeau, 1992), and more recently in developing countries ( Schuknecht, 2000 ).”
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services (2005, background): “5 Cross-country evidence indicates that electoral cycles in monetary and fiscal policy are significantly larger in developing economies (Block 2002; Schuknecht 2000; Shi and Svensson 2000).”
Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? (2010, unknown): “4.2 Empirical specification Many previous studies have explored pre-electoral effects on fiscal policy in a dynamic Fixed Effects model specification (see, among others, Schuknecht 2000; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Brender and Drazen 2005).”
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor : Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services (2003, unknown): “electoral cycles in monetary and fiscal policy are significantly larger in developing countries (Shi and Svensson, 2002; Block, 2002; Schuknecht, 2000).”
Public and private sector wages interactions in a general equilibrium model (2010, unknown): “For developing countries, the data seem to confirm the predictions of rent-seeking theories and election cycles (Gelb et al. 1991; Schuknecht 2000 ).”