Tunneling or Value Addition? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups

By Kee‐Hong Bae, Jun-Koo Kang, Jin-Mo Kim. 2000

1,162 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6fd7e5650bfa78271b66bd5a337d1ba5371ef9b2

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Citations in the corpus

The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction (2005, positive): “9 See Bae et al. (2002), Bebchuk et al. (2000), Barca and Becht (2001), Bertrand et al. (2002), Claessens et al. (2000, 2002), Daniels et al. (1995), Faccio and Lang (2003), Faccio et al. (2001), Faccio (2002), Ghemawat and Khanna (1998), Khanna (2000), Granovetter (in press), Khanna and Palepu (200”
Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective ☆ (2007, background): “3 For example, Claessens et al. (2000), Bertrand et al. (2002), Bae et al. (2002), Bai et al. (2004a), and Firedman et al. (2003) all provide empirical evidence of tunneling by controlling shareholders in emerging markets.”
Does ESG Performance Enhance Firm Value? Evidence from Korea (2018, background): “recently been experiencing declining profits, coupled with a growing sense of owner risk problems, such as weak governance structure [28], tunneling by controlling shareholders [29,30], and political scandals.”
Are OECD-prescribed “good corporate governance practices” really good in an emerging economy? (2011, background): “For example, after the onset of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, “United Engineers Malaysia, a healthy firm with strong growth prospects, bought out some management-controlled shares of its financially troubled parent, Renong Corporation, at artificially high prices.”
Foreign investors and corporate governance in Korea (2010, background): “…and their affiliates on April 1, every year, based on the aggregated asset size from all affiliates listed as part of the conglomerates.6 Bae et al.(2002) indicate that top 30 chaebols are different from other firms; because the former are more diversified, reciprocal shareholding…”
Returns to Acquirers of Listed and Unlisted Targets (2006, positive): “Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) report similar results for Canada and Korea, respectively.”
Ownership Structure, Business Group Affiliation, Listing Status, and Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea (2006, neutral): “2 See Bae et al. (2002), Chang and Hong (2000), and Chang (2003) for a discussion of the characteristics of chaebols in Korea.”
Stock market liberalization and the information environment (2006, methodology): “have access to a variety of governance-related variables, such as foreign ownership and business group affiliation, that have been used by previous researchers ( Bae et al., 2002; Baek et al., 2004; Joh, 2003) and, as documented below, can help us understand interactions between governance and the ”
How corporate governance affect firm value? Evidence on a self-dealing channel from a natural experiment in Korea (2015, positive): “5 In Korea, Joh (2003) finds that Korean chaebol firms with high control-ownership disparity have lower profitability during the pre-crisis period.”
A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods (2012, positive): “7 Jian and Wong (2010) used a methodology partially based on Bertrand et al. (2002) to examine industry shocks and tunneling in Chinese state-owned firms during the years 1998-2002, but their study did not include firm fixed effects and their sample consisted solely of state-owned firms.”