In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit

By Mike Burkart, Tore Ellingsen. 2004

930 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6faa13a6ad5cf9f39003f144801ca9de67b7e0f5

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Citations in the corpus

European trade credit use and SME survival (2018, neutral): “While suppliers of goods have the ability to control and cut off future supplies, receivables can be used as collateral for bank credit (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004).”
Leasing, Ability to Repossess, and Debt Capacity (2009, background): “Coase (1972) and Bulow (1986) argue that a durable goods monopolist may choose to lease goods to overcome the time inconsistency problem.”
The Impact of Firm Characteristics in Access of Financing by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Tanzania (2012, background): “3.3.3 Firm Size The firm’s size has a crucial weight on the debt proportion in the capital structure of the firm since real assets tend to influence the accessibility to long debt whenever required (Burkart & Ellingsen, 2004).”
A More Complete Conceptual Framework for Financing of Small and Medium Enterprises (2005, background): “…to less creditworthy firms when trade creditors are given a security interest, and an advantage in financing nonstandardized products (Cook 1999, Cunat 2003, Frank and Maksimovic 2003, Burkart and Ellingsen 2004, Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti 2005, Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 2006).”
Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries (2005, neutral): “…most of their trade credit to borrowers via in-kind loans rather than as cash advances -- seed, fertilizer, or a voucher for transport services will be delivered to 59 the farmer rather than cash (Burkart and Ellingsen 2004; Watts 1994) – and this too can be interpreted as a form of monitoring.”
On the Financing Benefits of Supply Chain Transparency and Blockchain Adoption (2020, neutral): “that of the supplier, respectively, Cachon and Lariviere (2001) and Özer and Wei (2006) show that the manufacturer can signal by overordering.”
Trade Credit Provision and National Culture (2016, neutral): “Finally, with respect to moral hazard, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) argue that relative to banks, trade creditors are in a 8 In a related paper, Biais and Gollier (1997) show that trade credit and bank credit are complements.”
A more complete conceptual framework for SME finance (2006, background): “…to less creditworthy firms when trade creditors are given a security interest, and an advantage in financing nonstandardized products (Cook 1999, Cunat 2003, Frank and Maksimovic 2003, Burkart and Ellingsen 2004, Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti 2005, Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 2006).”
Ensuring Sales: A Theory of Inter-firm Credit (2011, methodology): “Further, there exists a cutoff pUptc > 0 which is such that the upstream participation-in-tradecredit constraint holds whenever p > pUptc, implying that efficiency is restored for any p such that pUptc 6 p pDic .”
Counter-cyclical substitution between trade credit and bank credit (2011, background): “However, it is an in-kind financing, providing the advantage of controlling diversion behavior of the manufacturer (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004).”
Trade credit and supplier competition (2019, background): “1 Following Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), we assume that each supplier sets a trade credit limit beyond which it requires cash payment.”