Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits

By Javed Younas. 2008

312 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Information Systems, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6eaa6678bd2bd4616387ce5b75b71477523edaef

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Citations in the corpus

Expressive behavior in economics and politics (2010, background): “The other traveler withdraws from the purchase but then later is seen furtively taking the opportunity to 23 Where aid is predicated on a reciprocal benefit, there is no presumption of generosity (Younas, 2008). buy trinkets from the child.”
Foreign direct investment, aid, and terrorism (2014, background): “Does the mitigating effect of aid on terrorism-induced reductions in FDI/GDP differ across these two types of aid, since the donors’ motives for providing each type of aid might differ (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Younas, 2008)? Because donor countries have more control over bilateral aid, prime-tar”
Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy (2011, background): “…often seen as inefficient and ineffective+ Given these beliefs, one would expect individuals holding liberal values to support aid and be less 45+ Younas 2008+ 46+ Ibid+ 47+ For example, Kalt and Zupan 1993+ 48+ For example, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006+ 49+ Noël and Thérien 2008+ 50+ See…”
International financing for climate change adaptation in small island developing states (2017, background): “…central; the larger ‘strategic and foreign policy concerns’ literature emphasises the selfinterest of donors in providing aid, concentrating on motives linked to colonial history, natural and other resources, as well as military, trade and investment ties (see e.g. Berthélemy 2006; Younas 2008).”
The ineffectiveness of development aid on growth: An update (2011, unknown): “Many papers discuss strategic and commercial interests of donors; see e.g., Younas (2008).”
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN LEGISLATORS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AID (2009, background): “Since poor recipient countries have a higher marginal propensity to consume certain goods, such as capital-intensive imports, than rich donor countries (Younas, 2008), a transfer will raise the world prices of these goods.”