Financial Constraints on Corporate Goodness

By Harrison G. Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik, Jose A. Scheinkman. 2012

406 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6e677c4767fb2b8e6c154a6c27810f79ecbe061a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Socially responsible corporate customers (2020, background): “Many of these studies examine the impact of CSR engagements on various metrics of profitability, cash flow, valuation, and risk (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2012; Servaes, and Tamayo, 2013; Flammer, 2015), whereas others look at institutional effects on a firm’s CSR adoption (e.g., Ioannou…”
Investor horizons, long-term blockholders, and corporate social responsibility (2019, background): “In addition, Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman (2012) and Cronqvist and Yu (2015) find that managers invest more in CSR when they have financial slack or when they have daughters.”
Does the ESG Index Affect Stock Return? Evidence from the Eurostoxx50 (2020, background): “[37] the more profitable companies, in terms of ESG standards, are the ones subject to softer financial constraints.”
Ethical requirement and financial interest: a literature review on socially responsible investing (2015, background): “A contradicting new look on the link between CSR projects and a firm’s financial performance is taken by Hong et al. (2012), who point out a reverse causality between both.”
Going to Haven? Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance (2019, background): “9 Huseynov and Klamm (2012) find that the interaction of corporate governance strengths and diversity concerns with tax management fees negatively affects Cash ETRs.”
Signaling through corporate accountability reporting (2015, unknown): “Ceteris paribus, a firm that expects to have more operational slack in future periods is more likely to undertake special projects (Fazzari et al., 1988) and such projects can include CSR-related activities (Hong et al., 2012).”
The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying (2016, unknown): “7 Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman (2012) use KLD scores as an empirical measure of “corporate goodness”.”
Firms and social responsibility: A review of ESG and CSR research in corporate finance (2021, background): “In line with that argument, Hong and Liskovich (2015) provide evidence that firms with higher CSR ratings (as reflected by KLD scores) receive more lenient settlements from prosecutors and have higher resulting market valuations (using enforcements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in their tests”