Monitoring Costs and Trade Credit

By Neelam Jain. 2001

202 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6dacfe1ff71a9be1381c55fd5d1fb8ccdc4f0482

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Citations in the corpus

Trade Credit Provision and National Culture (2016, unknown): “Reflecting sellers’ comparative advantage in information acquisition, Jain (2001) argues that banks with asymmetric information about borrowers prefer to lend through better-informed suppliers, that is, banks prefer to provide credit to suppliers, which in turn extend trade credit to…”
What you sell is what you lend? Explaining trade credit contracts (2004, unknown): “Although banks gather information to assess the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, a supplier may sometimes have access to superior information (e.g., Biais and Gollier, 1997; Jain, 2001).”
A review of trade credit literature: Opportunities for research in operations (2013, background): “Third, suppliers might act as intermediaries between buyers and banks because the first possess superior informat ion (Emery, 1984; Jain, 2001 ).”
Trade Credit, Bank Lending and Monetary Policy Transmission (2003, background): “Jain (2001) argues that non-financial firms extend credit to their customers as intermediaries between banks and the ultimate buyers.”
Trade credit and supplier competition (2019, unknown): “…creditworthiness (see, e.g., Smith, 1987; Biais and Gollier, 1997; Chod, Trichakis, and Tsoukalas, 2017), monitoring borrowers’ revenue (e.g., Jain, 2001), enforcing credit repayment (e.g., Cuñat, 2007), renegotiating debt (e.g., Wilner, 2000), or salvaging repossessed inventory upon…”
In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit (2004, background): “569 (1978, 1979), Gary Emery (1987), Xavier Freixas (1993), Bruno Biais and Christian Gollier (1997), Neelam Jain (2001), and others.”
On the Financing Benefits of Supply Chain Transparency and Blockchain Adoption (2020, background): “The explanation offered by our model is distinct from, and possibly more robust than, existing explanations that rationalize supplier financing based on the assumption that suppliers have an a priori informational advantage over banks (Emery 1984, Biais and Gollier 1997, Jain 2001).”
Debt financing, survival, and growth of start-up firms (2017, unknown): “A number of studies, including Schwartz and Whitcomb (1977, 1978), Emery (1984), Freixas (1993), Biais and Gollier (1997), Jain (2001), and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), argue that a supplier obtains information about its borrowers through the business relationships with those firms, mitigating the…”