Political Freedom, Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty: A Study of Political Institutions and Private Investment in Developing Countries

By Yi Feng. 2001

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Economic and political institutions and entry into formal and informal entrepreneurship (2014, unknown): “Majority-based political institutions and consensus on the rule of law secure a fair and efficient political process, and notably, smooth and predictable changes in government which allow the elected party to make gradual and predictable policy adjustments (Feng, 2002; Li & Resnick, 2003).”
Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in Sovereign Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law (2012, background): “…appreciate the advice of the two anonymous reviewers of our manuscript+ 1+ See Biglaiser and Staats 2010; Biglaiser, Hicks, and Huggins 2008; Busse 2004; Feng 2001; Henisz 2000; Jensen 2003, 2006, and 2008; Li 2006 and 2009; Li and Resnick 2003; North and Weingast 1989; Schultz and Weingast 1996,…”
Explaining the Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technology in Developing Countries (2013, background): “ 2006; De Vanssay and Spindler 1994; Feng 2001; Pastor 1995; Seldadyo et al.”
Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment (2009, background): “Others (e.g., Feng, 2001; Jensen, 2003; Li, 2006; Li & Resnick, 2003) argue that democracies attract investment, domestic and foreign, because they offer better property rights protection.”