Controlled & automatic processing: behavior, theory, and biological mechanisms

By Walter Schneider, Jason M. Chein. Cognitive Sciences, 2003

718 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6a71c1463f5803a56fd64dfe404925f1d09afa1e

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

Citations in the corpus

Are you always on my mind? A review of how face perception and attention interact. (2007, background): “…Batty & Taylor, 2003; ¨ Ohman, 1997), non-conscious (e.g., Bargh, 1997; ¨ Ohman, 2002; Robinson, 1998), mandatory (e.g., Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver, 1998) and capacity-free, requiring minimal attentional resources (e.g., Schneider & Chein, 2003; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001).”
Directed Attention as a Common Resource for Executive Functioning and Self-Regulation (2010, background): “Likewise, Schneider and Chein (2003) theo-rize, as would Moors and De Houwer (2006), that effort level may distinguish automatic from controlled processing.”
The links between self-determined motivations and behavioral automaticity in a variety of real-life behaviors (2017, background): “For example, IM is often presented as a spontaneous tendency to act (Ryan and Deci 2000) and spontaneity is often used to describe automatic processes (Schneider 2003).”
Cognitive Load and Classroom Teaching: The Double-Edged Sword of Automaticity (2007, background): “…model of cognition indicates that controlled and automatic processes operate independently but intersect at certain points to produce human performance (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Devine & Monteith, 1999; Schneider & Chein, 2003; Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005).”
Cognitive Lie Detection: Response Time and Consistency of Answers as Cues to Deception (2009, background): “As mentioned earlier, cognitive resources are required to inhibit practiced responses, such as automated truths, resulting in longer response times ( Schneider and Chein 2003 ).”
Cognitive load in simultaneous interpreting: Model meets data (2012, background): “Anticipation is the strategy (to the extent that the process is controlled and not automatic; see Schneider & Chein, 2003) by which the interpreter attempts to guess a sentence constituent, in this case the verb, before it has been uttered in the original.”
Neural Programmer-Interpreters (2015, background): “In cognitive science, several theories of brain areas controlling other brain parts so as to carry out multiple tasks have been proposed; see for example Schneider & Chein (2003); Anderson (2010) and Donnarumma et al. (2012).”
Goal-directed and habitual control in the basal ganglia: implications for Parkinson's disease (2010, background): “Their analysis was based on the recognition that goal-directed responding is flexible but slow and carries comparatively high computational costs as opposed to the fast but inflexible habitual mod”
Visual Attention and Brain Processes That Underlie Expert Performance: Implications for Sport and Military Psychology (2008, result): “This interpretation is consistent with the well established notion of automaticity of skilled motor performance in which advanced performers are unconscious of the details of their performance as they execute “in the moment” (Fitts & Posner, 1967; Schneider & Chein, 2003; Schneider & Shiffrin; 197”
Implicit Cognition and Addiction: A Tool for Explaining Paradoxical Behavior (2010, background): “…classified as implicit memory can be traced back at least to the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries in work by Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Maine de Biran, Herbart, Carpenter, Schopenhauer, Hering, Binet, Korsakoff, Janet, Freud, and others (for historical review, see Schacter 1987).”
On the distinction between rationality and intelligence: Implications for understanding individual differences in reasoning. (2012, neutral): “…set of specialty areas not limited to cognitive psychology, social psychology, naturalistic philosophy, decision theory, and clinical psychology (Evans, 2003, 2008, 2010; Frankish, 2004; Lieberman, 2007, 2009; Schneider & Chein, 2003; Sloman, 1996, 2002; Smith & Decoster, 2000; Stanovich, 1999).”
Switching from automatic to controlled action by monkey medial frontal cortex (2007, background): “In such novel encounters (for example, with road work or a child on a crosswalk), the automatic action must be replaced with a deliberately controlled action (for example, making a detour through unfamiliar routes or stepping on the brake instead of automatically accelerating”