Probabilistic Sophistication and Multiple Priors

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Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude (2004, methodology): “We also present the axiomatic characterization of the natural generalization of these two decision rules— a decision rule akin to Hurwicz’s a-pessimism rule, known in the literature as the ‘‘a-MEU’’ decision rule (e.g., [ 27 ]).”
A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity (2005, unknown): “It is also present in the approaches to comparative ambiguity aversion developed in Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).”
Rational preferences under ambiguity (2011, background): “We can thus conclude that with the chosen A ∈ we have for each B ∈ and each P ∈ C , P∗(B) = P∗(A) ⇒ P(B) = P(A) so that P∗ = P follows from Theorem 2 of Marinacci (2002). Since this is true for each P ∈ C—that is, C = {P∗}—we conclude that is a SEU preference with probability P∗.”
Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences (2009, unknown): “Such subjective mixtures are different from subjective mixtures studied by Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2003), whose construction relies on rangeconvexity of u.”
Decision making with imprecise probabilistic information (2004, methodology): “This definition differs from the one in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and Epstein (1999), in that we restrict attention to comparisons among binary lotteries and binary acts.”