ICMP Traceback Messages
By T. Taylor, Marcus D. Leech, Steven M. Bellovin. 2003
667 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Electrical and Electronic Engineering
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/688df4fca429b352fdaa14c16c3693fd8cca1c65
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Kang G. Shin
- Haining Wang
- David Wetherall
- Peter L. Reiher
- T. Anderson
- Danlu Zhang
- Jelena Mirkovic
- Vern Paxson
In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- T. Anderson
- David Wetherall
- Heejo Lee
- Kihong Park
- Anna R. Karlin
- Stefan Savage
- Peter L. Reiher
- Jelena Mirkovic
Citations in the corpus
- Practical network support for IP traceback (2000, methodology): “As with the ICMP Traceback approach [4], an additional mechani sm incorporating a shared secret is required to completely add ress the problem of attackers spoofing edges.”
- Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the network (2002, background): “Two common mechanisms to counter DDoS attacks are ingress filtering [7] and traceback [1, 24, 26].”
- Implementing Pushback: Router-Based Defense Against DDoS Attacks (2002, neutral): “variants aretraceback[1] and packet marking [16, 6].”
- Attacking DDoS at the source (2002, background): “Several systems combat DDoS attacks by using traceback mechanisms to locate attacking nodes ([1], [18]).”
- Change-point monitoring for the detection of DoS attacks (2004, background): “To identify the compromised end-hosts that directly generate flooding packets and the network path that these packets take, various traceback techniques [3], [7], [11], [47], [50], [51] have been proposed.”
- On the effectiveness of probabilistic packet marking for IP traceback under denial of service attack (2001, methodology): “ing the physical source of a DoS attack [6], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14].”
- Detecting SYN flooding attacks (2002, background): “They have to rely on the expensive IP traceback [2], [21], [25], [28], [29], [34] to locate the flooding sources.”
- Hop-count filtering: an effective defense against spoofed DDoS traffic (2003, background): “Off-line IP traceback [4], [36], [37], [38], [41] attempts to establish procedures to track down flooding sources after occurrences of DDoS attacks.”
- Network support for IP traceback (2001, methodology): “As with the ICMP Traceback approach [4], an additional mechanism incorporating a shared secret is required to completely address the problem of attackers spoofing edges.”
- Single-packet IP traceback (2002, background): “Because of the high overhead involved, neither Savage et al. nor Bellovin attempt to provide audit information for every packet.”