Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining

By E. Helpman, Torsten Persson. 2001

153 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/67b79764e5ca8a57846f910f2905ebef41d4f0d7

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Barry C. Burden
2. Brian G. Knight
3. Fernanda Brollo
4. T. Nannicini
5. Feng Xie
6. David M Levinson

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Barry C. Burden
2. Brian G. Knight
3. T. Nannicini
4. Fernanda Brollo
5. David M Levinson
6. Enrico Moretti
7. Feng Xie

In Strategy and Management

1. Brian G. Knight

Citations in the corpus

• Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress* (2008, background): “…(McKelvey and Riezman, 1992), pork barrel inefficiencies (Baron, 1991), social choice (Banks and Duggan, 2000), special interest politics (Persson, 1998; Helpman and Persson, 2001; Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2001), tax expenditures (Dharmapala, 1999) and public investment goods (Leblanc et al., 2000).”
• “Plata o Plomo?”: Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence (2006, unknown): “At least since the work of Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974), economists associate the possibility of official discretion with rent-seeking waste and worse economic performance.”
• The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending (2010, background): “Much of this scholarship explores how different recognition rules yield different predictions about the distribution of federal benefits (see, for example, Helpman and Persson 2001; McKelvey and Riezman 1992; McCarty 2000a; Persson 1998; Persson and Tabellini 2002; Yildirim 2007).”