IT'S WHAT YOU SAY, NOT WHAT YOU PAY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF MANAGER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIPS IN OVERCOMING COORDINATION FAILURE

By Jordi Brandts, David J. Cooper. 2005

212 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/67a5259ec551bd7b1b7bb41d58fd0e14d532129d

Citations in the corpus

• The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection (2011, unknown): “The effect of communication in a coordination game may work through a different channel than otherregarding preferences, such as trust or learning (see Brandts and Cooper (2007) for a list, based on the content of the messages sent by the managers).”
• When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory (2007, unknown): “ Brandts and Cooper (2005a) address this issue head-on.”
• Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments (2012, unknown): “Put differently, one could interpret the prices above one as very low collusive prices but probably a more sensible interpretation is that prices reflect the non-collusive solution for n > 2.(10)”