All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes
By Daniel W. Drezner. 2007
683 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Finance, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/66fde93cee4314ee07416c47677beed6392797f8
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Finance
- C. Damro
- Elliot Posner
- Abraham L. Newman
- Henry Farrell
- Sophie Meunier
- E. Tsingou
- Cornelia Woll
- B. Clift
In Political Science and International Relations
- Elliot Posner
- C. Damro
- Sophie Meunier
- L. Jones
- Abraham L. Newman
- E. Tsingou
- Manfred Elsig
- Alasdair R. Young
In Strategy and Management
- Elliot Posner
- C. Damro
- Abraham L. Newman
- Henry Farrell
- Sophie Meunier
- E. Tsingou
- Tim Bartley
- Marc Schneiberg
Citations in the corpus
- Market power Europe (2012, background): “Their standards act as an attractor, causing other actors to converge to their preferences’ (Drezner 2007: 32–3).”
- Economic patriotism: reinventing control over open markets (2012, background): “The majority of negotiations in international economic integration today concern not fully fledged liberalization or outright protectionism, but effects of domestic regulation for the free movement of capital, labour, goods or services (Drezner 2007).”
- Not your parents' trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations (2016, background): “Regulatory cooperation, therefore, often has distributional implications (Drezner 2007: 5; Krasner 1991: 336), which prompts the expectation that firms from the different parties would be rivals, each championing ‘its’ regulation.”
- Europe and the management of globalization (2010, background): “Others are even more optimistic still, especially when they begin from the substantial power conferred upon Europe through the sheer size of its market (Drezner 2007).”
- Rising powers and state transformation: The case of China (2016, background): “Preliminary examples, albeit constrained by a continued neglect of state transformation, include Drezner (2008) and Mattli and Woods (2009).”
- Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy (2010, background): “US relationship for issues of international market regulation see Drezner (2007).”
- Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium (2009, methodology): “Such variance in regulatory centralization lends itself to a few simple empirical expectations about transatlantic dispute management+When Europeans rely heavily on principles such as complete standardization, mandating a single set of rules with which local and American firms must comply, we would ”
- Principal–agent theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex agency and ‘missing delegation’ (2011, background): “In other words, there is no need to delegate power to the Secretariat as key members dominate decision-making and thus outcomes reflect the interests of these powerful states (Drezner, 2007).”
- Evaluating Three Explanations for the Design of Bilateral Investment Treaties (2014, background): “…are not so pronounced should we see treaties that do not reflect the wishes of the capital-exporting state within the pairing.47 in terms of preferences, all else equal, home-state governments will prefer bIts to include multiple, strong options for enforcing the treaties.48 42 drezner 2007.”
- Club governance and the making of global financial rules (2015, background): “…‘clubs’ are used either to mark out flexible, less institutionalized and regulation-focused inter-governmental arenas such as the Basel Committee (Drezner, 2007) or, following club economic theory, memberdriven groupings with clear rules, club benefits and (usually) excludable club goods…”
- Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century (2008, background): “The California effect appears to depend on whether harmonized stringency is compatible with the interests of powerful governments (Drezner 2007, Simmons 2003), whether international organizations or collectivities of nations have the capacity to exclude laggards from lucrative markets (DeSombre…”
- The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda (2011, background): “…and Development ~OECD!, Bank for International Settlements ~BIS!, the Committee on the Global Financial System, and the European Central Bank+ 8+ Drezner 2007, 139+ 9+ Drezner 2007 also argues that state preferences are strongly influenced by domestic politics, particularly the resistance…”
- The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity (2009, background): “30 Drezner 2007a, ch. 7.”