Evaluating Three Explanations for the Design of Bilateral Investment Treaties

By Todd L. Allee, Clint Peinhardt. 2014

132 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/55001172857f3c01ab9cbfcc038025f3cebcd55a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Development

1. Beth A. Simmons
2. Sonal S. Pandya
3. Eric Neumayer
4. Fabrizio Gilardi
5. Davide Romelli
6. David M. J. Lazer

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Beth A. Simmons
2. Sonal S. Pandya
3. J. Stein
4. Eric Neumayer
5. Fabrizio Gilardi
6. Davide Romelli
7. David M. J. Lazer

In Strategy and Management

1. Sonal S. Pandya
2. Beth A. Simmons
3. J. Stein
4. Eric Neumayer
5. Fabrizio Gilardi
6. Andrew Kerner
7. Davide Romelli
8. David M. J. Lazer

Citations in the corpus

• Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment: Globalized Production in the Twenty-First Century (2016, background): “Allee & Peinhardt (2014) identify three traits that make BITs more constraining: binding third-party arbitration, multiple disputesettlement venues, and arbitration by a standing body rather than an ad hoc one.”
• Bargaining over BITs, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and Promotion of International Investment (2014, background): “4 allee and Peinhardt 2014.”
• Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment (2016, unknown): “States routinely use bilateral investment treaties to create legal commitments to protect foreign investment (Allee and Peinhardt 2014; Büthe and Milner 2008; 2014; Milner 2014; Simmons 2014).”