Multiple-Prize Contests the Optimal Allocation of Prizes
By Dana Sisak. 2009
110 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/665f754e73f195624c0cc0ab1d0921978e03ce63
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
In Safety Research
- Emmanuel Dechenaux
- Dan Kovenock
- Roman M. Sheremeta
- Kevin J. Boudreau
- Karim R. Lakhani
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury
- Joel West
- Shakun D. Mago
Citations in the corpus
- Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China (2018, unknown): “The case of multiple winners can be similarly analyzed following the models summarized in Sisak (2009), and the analysis is relegated to the Online Appendix.”
- Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis (2011, background): “…for homogeneous and risk-neutral individuals; multiple prizes are optimal when contestants have asymmetric ability and are risk averse (see Sisak 2009 for a review of the theoretical literature); and penalties are useful for motivating further effort by top-tier contestants (see, for…”
- A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, background): “3.3 Multiple prizes Theoretical research has shown that the optimal prize structure in contests depends on many factors (for a review see Sisak 2009).”