IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs

By Mohsin S. Khan, Sunil K. Sharma. 2001

165 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Finance, Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/662151e88f6c0a3fad3648931bad47f4eae8033e

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In Development

1. J. Kelley
2. R. Stone
3. Axel Dreher
4. G. Garrett
5. Beth A. Simmons
6. J. Vreeland
7. Christopher Kilby
8. Mark Copelovitch

In Finance

1. R. Stone
2. Axel Dreher
3. J. Kelley
4. G. Garrett
5. Beth A. Simmons
6. F. Dobbin
7. Christopher Kilby
8. J. Vreeland

In Information Systems

1. J. Kelley
2. Axel Dreher
3. R. Stone

Citations in the corpus

• The Scope of IMF Conditionality (2008, background): “…programs are associated with lower GDP growth rates, Przeworski and Vreeland 2000 inferred that lending is conditioned on inappropriate policy measures+ 36+ Khan and Sharma 2001; and Drazen 2002 call for greater ownership; IMF 2005 introduced the initiative to streamline conditionality+ Even…”
• International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions (2004, background): “10 17 /S 00 20 81 83 04 58 30 17 of Europe to change the aforementioned attitude, which will practically result in delay in Latvia’s admission to that organization+” 72 In the midst of a government crisis,73 the parliament managed to approve an amended Law on Citizenship in late July+74 The amendmen”
• The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition or Learning? (2007, background): “…that they may seek to discourage moral hazard problems that can lead to system-wide financial instability (Guitian 1995, Mishkin 1999), encourage the repayment of sovereign debt (Babai 1988, Fafchamps 1996, Hopkins et al. 1997), and protect lenders’ investments (Guitian 1995, Khan & Sharma 2001).”
• IMF conditionality: theory and evidence (2008, background): “…of the IMF, and withholding money is likely to hurt the poor (“Samaritan’s Dilemma”).54 Conditionality is ineffective because it amounts to a noncredible threat; non-disbursements of funds might not be time-consistent (Coate and Morris 1999; Svensson 2000; Drazen 2000; Khan and Sharma 2001).”