The Effects of Employment Protection: Learning from Variable Enforcement

By T. Boeri. 2003

337 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions, Public Administration

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/65f2afb207e328af07920290ad6c5376e3feb134

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Citations in the corpus

Who Pays for It? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation (2013, neutral): “Boeri and Jimeno (2005) assess the e¤ect of EPL on lay-o¤ probabilities by comparing rms below and above 15 employees in Italy, while Kugler and Pica (2006) examine the joint impact of EPL and product market regulation on job ows in Italy using both the rm size threshold and a law change.”
Identifying the Effects of Firing Restrictions Through Size-Contingent Differences in Regulation (2008, background): “In terms of employment policies, Boeri and Jimeno (2005) consider the implications of the EPL threshold for dismissal probabilities in Italy and Spain, finding that workers employed in firms whose size entails more stringent employment protection have a lower probability of being dismissed.”
Employment Regulations Through the Eyes of Employers: Do They Matter and How Do Firms Respond to Them? (2004, neutral): “Small firms are often exempted from certain aspects of labor regulations (Boeri and Jimeno, 2003).”
Dismissals for Cause: The Difference That Just Eight Paragraphs Can Make (2009, neutral): “I examine not only employment and job and worker flows (Oyer and Schaefer 2000; Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Autor 2003; Kugler and Saint-Paul 2004; Boeri and Jimeno 2005; Autor, Donohue, and Schwab 2006; Bauer, Bender, 1 In many countries, firms need to go through costly administrative procedures…”
Labor Market Regulations: What Do We Know About Their Impacts in Developing Countries? (2014, neutral): “There are examples of studies that attempt to incorporate the application of regulations and policies into the analysis of the impacts of institutions (e.g., Boeri and Jimeno 2005; Micco and Page´s 2006; Almeida and Carneiro 2009).”
Two Tier Reforms of Employment Protection: a Honeymoon Effect?* (2007, neutral): “Fixed term contracts are used more by large firms than by small firms as units with less than 15 employees are exempted from the most rigid employment protection regulations (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005).”
Dismissal Protection and Worker Flows in Small Establishments (2007, neutral): “Additional estimates by Boeri and Jimeno-Serrano (2003) exploring the same data and institutional setting do not confirm this finding.”
Employment Protection Legislation, Multinational Firms, and Innovation (2012, background): “Boeri and Jimeno (2005), argue that for large firms (which is what we consider in our empirical application), where monitoring is very difficult, the dominant effect of EPL is that it decreases the probability of economic dismissal and therefore increases the value of employment to the worker and re”
Employment Protection Legislation, Adjustment Costs and Cross-Country Differences in Cost Behavior (2012, background): “…(1993), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Heckman et al. (2000), Blanchard and Portugal (2001), Besley and Burgess (2004), Botero et al. (2004), Boeri and Jimeno (2005), Haltiwanger et al. (2006), Micco and Pages (2006), Autor et al. (2007), Kugler and Pica (2008), Schivardi and Torrini (2008)…”
Enforcement of labor regulation and firm size (2009, result): “Our results are roughly similar, but more imprecise, because this second variable has smaller predictive power in the first stage regressions.(11) More details on the construction of this variable as well as on enforcement are given in the data appendix.”
Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France (2013, neutral): “We also show that there is no evidence that workers place a positive economic value on this regulation.(16).”
Jobs for Shared Prosperity: Time for Action in the Middle East and North Africa (2013, background): “Further studies show that restrictive legislation slows down the speed of labor reallocation from low- to high-productivity activities (Besley and Burgess 2004; Boeri and Jimeno 2005; Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger 2010; Messina and Vallanti 2007; Micco and Pages 2006).”
Setting It Right: Employment Protection, Labour Reallocation and Productivity (2011, background): “Boeri and Jimeno (2005) exploit specific clauses exonerating small Italian firms from job security provisions: their results confirm a significant negative impact of employment protection on job turnover and job destruction, in particular.”